The mass needs, and we give it, leaders who have the firmness and decision of command proceeding from habit and an entire faith in their unquestionable right to command as established by tradition, law and society.—Ardant du Picq, Battles Studies
Someone who has not studied the matter would underestimate the influence of leadership in enabling killing on the battlefield, but those who have been there know better. A 1974 study by Kranss, Kaplan, and Kranss investigated the factors that make a soldier fire. They found that the individuals who had no combat experience assumed that "being fired upon" would be the critical factor in making them fire. However, veterans listed "being told to fire" as the most critical factor.
More than a century ago, Ardant du Picq found the same thing in his study based on a survey of military officers. He noted one incident during the Crimean War in which, during heavy fighting, two detachments of soldiers suddenly met unexpectedly face-to-face, at "ten paces." They "stopped thunderstruck. Then, forgetting their rifles, threw stones and withdrew." The reason for this behavior, according to du Picq, was that "neither of the two groups had a decided leader."
Authority FactorsBut it is more complex than the simple influence of orders by a leader. There are many factors in the relationship between the potential killer and the authority that influence the decision to kill.
In Milgram's experiments the demands of authority were represented by an individual with a clipboard and a white lab coat. The authority figure stood immediately behind the individual who was inflicting shocks and directed that he increase the voltage each time the victim answered a question incorrectly. When the authority figure was not personally present but called over a phone, the number of subjects who were willing to inflict the maximum shock dropped sharply. This process can be generalized to combat circumstances and "operationaized" into a number of subfactors: proximity of the authority figure, respect for the authority figure, intensity of the authority figure's demands, and the authority figure's legitimacy.
• Proximity of the authority figure to the subject. Marshall noted many specific World War II incidents in which almost all solders would fire their weapons while their leaders observed and encouraged them in a combat situation, but when the leaders left, the firing rate immediately dropped to 15 to 20 percent.
• Killer's subjective respect for the authority figure. To be truly effective, soldiers must bond to their leader just as they must bond to their group. Shalit notes a 1973 Israeli study that shows that the primary factor in ensuring the will to fight is identification with the direct commanding officer. Compared with an established and respected leader, an unknown or discredited leader has much less chance of gaining compliance from soldiers in combat.
Intensity of the authority figure's demands for killing behavior. The leader's mere presence is not always sufficient to ensure killing activity. The leader must also communicate a clear expectancy of killing behavior. When he does, the influence can be enormous. When Lieutenant Calley first ordered his men to kill a group of women and children in the village of My Lai, he said, "You know what to do with them," and left. When he came back he asked, "Why haven't you killed them?" The solder he confronted said, "I didn't think you wanted us to kill them." "No," Calley responded, "I want them dead," and proceeded to fire at them himself. Only then was he able to get his solders to start shooting in this extraordinary circumstance in which the soldiers' resistance to killing was, understandaby, very high.
Legitimacy of the authority figure's authority and demands. Leaders with legitimate, societally sanctioned authority have greater influence on their solders; and legitimate, lawful demands are more likely to be obeyed than illegal or unanticipated demands. Gang leaders and mercenary commanders have to carefully work around their shortcomings in this area, but military officers (with their trappings of power and the legitimate authority of their nation behind them) have tremendous potential to cause their solders to overcome individual resistance and reluctance in combat.
More than a century ago, Ardant du Picq found the same thing in his study
based on a survey of military officers. He noted one incident during the Crimean
War in which, during heavy fighting, two detachments of soldiers suddenly
met unexpectedly face-to-face, at "ten paces." They "stopped thunderstruck.
Then, forgetting their rifles, threw stones and withdrew." The reason for
this behavior, according to du Picq, was that "neither of the two groups had
a decided leader."
—On Killing
